Too Much Oil for the Rubber-Stamp: The Government\u27s Role in the BP Oil Spill by Lopez, Jaclyn
Florida A & M University Law Review
Volume 6
Number 2 New Directions in Environmental Law and
Justice Symposium Edition
Article 5
Spring 2011
Too Much Oil for the Rubber-Stamp: The
Government's Role in the BP Oil Spill
Jaclyn Lopez
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida A & M
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. For more information, please contact linda.barrette@famu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jaclyn Lopez, Too Much Oil for the Rubber-Stamp: The Government's Role in the BP Oil Spill, 6 Fla. A&M U. L. Rev. (2011).
Available at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview/vol6/iss2/5
Too MUCH OIL FOR THE RUBBER-STAMP:
THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN THE
BP OIL SPILL
Jaclyn Lopez
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................ 201
II. THE BP OIL SPILL AND THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT ............................................... 203
A. Categorical Exclusion Policy ....................... 208
III. INADEQUATE CONSULTATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT ............................................. 210
IV. UNPRECEDENTED USE OF DISPERSANTS .................... 212
V. CONCLUSION .............................................. 213
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of British Petroleum's ("BP") Deepwater Horizon oil
spill, Michael Ellis, a veteran charter boat captain, volunteered to as-
sist BP with oil spill cleanup efforts. He signed a vessels of
opportunity contract with BP, which authorized him to charter a boat
in the Gulf of Mexico for sea turtle rescuers so that they could attempt
to save sea turtles impacted by the oil spill. Typical sea turtle rescues
involved identifying oil lines, which are places in the ocean where oil
accumulates at the convergence of two currents, and scooping out sea
turtles immobilized by the thick oil.
On several occasions, Mr. Ellis witnessed BP's use of "con-
trolled" or "in-situ" burns, a widely accepted method of containing and
disposing of oil. Responders conduct a controlled burn by dragging
fire-resistant booms behind boats to corral oil, where it has already
accumulated, and then lighting the enclosure on fire. In all, BP burned
approximately 10 million gallons of oil over 500 square miles in the
Gulf of Mexico during the summer of 2010.1 However, because the
1. Department of the Interior, Update: The Ongoing Administration-Wide Response
to the Deepwater BP Oil Spill http://www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Update-6-28-2010-The-
Ongoing-Administration-Wide-Response-to-the-Deepwater-BP-Oil-Spill.cfm (last visited
Mar. 21, 2011); Patrik Jonsson, BP Gulf Oil Spill: Turtles to be Protected from 'Burn Boxes',
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same oil lines that BP targeted for burning also trapped the sea tur-
tles, the practice had the propensity to harm rare and endangered sea
turtles such as: the Kemp's ridley, leatherback, green, loggerhead, and
hawksbill sea turtle by overwhelming, suffocating, and burning the
trapped sea turtles. Mr. Ellis became concerned that this was happen-
ing when BP refused to allow him and other boat captains close enough
to examine the oil lines to determine whether sea turtles were in fact
getting stranded and burned alive in the burn boxes.
While controlled burns are an approved oil spill response
method, activities that result in the unauthorized "take" of an endan-
gered species are not. Therefore, believing BP was engaged in the
unauthorized "take" of sea turtles and upon information obtained from
Mr. Ellis and others, environmental groups sought a temporary re-
straining order against BP seeking to stop it from engaging in
activities that kill, harm, and harass endangered and threatened sea
turtles in violation of the Endangered Species Act.2 The lawsuit re-
sulted in a settlement agreement where the U.S. Coast Guard and BP
temporarily agreed to cease oil burning, meet and confer with wildlife
agencies to minimize adverse impacts, and revise protocols for sea tur-
tle observation and rescue.3
The immediate halt and reform of the burn boxes was a small
but significant victory in the litany of litigation that followed the oil
spill. This article focuses on the impacts of the oil spill and response
efforts on wildlife and provides a brief overview of the role of two fed-
eral environmental laws in protecting endangered and threatened
species from the impacts of oil and gas drilling and production activi-
ties. This article is based on a presentation given by the author at the
Florida A&M University College of Law's Environmental Law and Jus-
tice Symposium, November 11-12, 2010. Part I reviews the
government's noncompliance with the National Environmental Policy
Act throughout its oil and gas leasing program and explains how that
may have contributed to the overall devastation of the oil spill. Part II
summarizes the failure of the government to comply with the Endan-
gered Species Act and how that lead to the injury of endangered and
The Christian Science Monitor, July 3, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2010/
0703/BP-Gulf-oil-spill-Turtles-to-be-protected-from-burn-boxes.
2. Center for Biological Diversity, Agreement Reached in Gulf to Prevent Sea Turtle
Burning Deaths Settlement Forces BP to rescue Sea Turtles Before Oil Slicks Set on Fire,
July 2, 2010, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press-releases/2010/gulf-sea-turtles-
07-02-2010.html.
3. Patrik Jonsson, BP Gulf Oil Spill: Turtles to be Protected from 'Burn Boxes', The
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 3, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/
2010/0703/BP-Gulf-oil-spill-Turtles-to-be-protected-from-burn-boxes.
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threatened species. Part III looks at the use of dispersants in the re-
sponse efforts and the long-term impacts that dispersants may have.
This article concludes that the government's failure to adhere to envi-
ronmental laws contributed to the overall environmental impact of the
oil spill and response efforts.
II. THE BP OIL SPILL AND THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
It is estimated that BP's failed Macondo well released 4.9 mil-
lion barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico.4 The spill impacted
over 500 miles of coastline, and the National Oceanic Atmosphere Ad-
ministration was forced to close large portions of the Gulf of Mexico to
fishing.5 The oil spill and response efforts impacted more than 15,000
different species that call the Gulf home,6 including dozens of endan-
gered or threatened species.7
Wildlife officials frantically transported and released more than
70,000 loggerhead hatchlings into waters far from the oil spill in an
attempt to keep them safe.8 To date, wildlife officials have collected
the carcasses of over 6,000 birds, 100 marine mammals, and over 600
sea turtles.9 There are no records of the numbers of fish, crustaceans,
and other small fauna that were impacted by the oil spill and response
efforts; however, scientists have discovered a brown substance killing
4. Campbell Robertson and Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill is the Largest of its Kind,
Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.
html.
5. http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/deepwater-horizon-oil-spill.htm (last visited Jul. 18,
2011).
6. D.L. Felder, D.K. Camp, and J.W. Tunnell, An Introduction to Gulf of Mexico
Biodiversity Assessment, in Gulf of Mexico Origin, Waters, and Biota Vol. I, Biodiversity, 8
(Texas A&M University Press 2009).
7. http://www.fws.gov/endangered/Marine mammals include: blue whale, fin whale,
humpback whale, North Atlantic right whale, sei whale, sperm whale, and West Indian
manatee; Sea turtles include: green, hawksbill, Kemp's ridley,leatherback, and loggerhead;
Fish include: Gulf sturgeon and smalltooth sawfish; coral include: elkhorn and staghorn;
Birds include: piping plover, whooping crane, and wood stork; Freshwater turtles include:
Alabama red-belly turtle; Land mammals include: Alabama, Choctawhatchee, Perdido, and
St. Andrew beach mouse.
8. Gulf Oil Spill: 70,000 Turtle Eggs to be Moved from Oily Beaches in Massive
Relocation Effort, THE HUFFINGTON PosT, Jun. 30, 2010, http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/
2010/06/30/gulf-oil-spill-70000-turt n_630562.html.
9. FWS, http://www.fws.gov/home/dhoilspill/collectionreports.html (select
"Consolidated Wildlife Table") (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
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coral in colonies located in 4,600 feet deep water about seven miles
southwest of the spill.1o
The direct impacts of crude oil on marine wildlife are well-docu-
mented.11 Impacts range from acute to chronic and lethal to sub-
lethal. Crude oil contains hundreds of compounds, mostly toxic hydro-
carbons, with polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons ("PAHs") causing some
of the most significant damage. Oil affects different TAXA in different
ways. Impacts to fish and sharks can include larval deformation and
death in partially weathered crude oil at less than one part per billion,
which is the equivalent to one drop of oil in a swimming pool full of
water.12 Sea turtle eggs suffer mortality due to smothering and oil's
toxicity,' 3 and sea turtles in the open ocean can ingest and inhale tar
balls. 14 Oil has an immediate impact on birds by destroying the water-
proofing and insulating properties of their feathers, which com-
promises their buoyancy and ability to thermo-regulate and exposes
them to additional stressors.15 Birds also suffer chronic effects from
PAH toxicity.' 6 Marine mammals inhale volatile compounds at the
surface and they can eat and swallow oil, which affects their ability to
locate food, and can have long-term population-wide effects.' 7 Oil is
also toxic to bottom-dwellers. Corals and other invertebrates suffer
mortality from smothering and impairment of reproduction, growth,
10. Mark Schleifstein, Scientists Find Dead and Dying Coral Covered With a Brown
Substance 7 Miles from BP Oil Spill Site, NOLA.com, Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.nola.com/
news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssfl2010/11/scientists find dead-and dying.html.
11. See D.A. Holdway, The acute and chronic effects of wastes associated with offshore
oil and gas production on temperate and tropical marine ecological processes, Marine
Pollution Bulletin 44:185-203, 2002; C.H. Peterson, S.D. Rice, J.W. Short, D. Esler, J.L.
Bodkin, B.E. Ballachey, and D.B. Irons, Long-term ecosystem response to the Exxon Valdez
oil spill, Science 302:2082-86, 2003.
12. M.G. Carls, S.D. Rice, and J.E. Hose, Sensitivity of Fish Embryos to Weathered
Crude Oil: Part L Low-Level Exposure During Incubation Causes Malformations, Genetic
Damage, and Mortality in Larval Pacific Herring (Clupea pallasi), Environmental
Toxicology and Chemistry 18:481-93, 1999.
13. NOAA, OIL AND SEA TURTLES: BIOLOGY, PLANNING, AND RESPONSE 38 (2010), http:l
response.restoration .noaa.gov/book-shelf/35_turtle-complete.pdf.
14. Id. at 39-40.
15. B.M. Jenseen, Review Article: Effects of Oil Pollution, Chemically Treated Oil, and
Cleaning on the Thermal Balance of Birds, Environmental Pollution 86:207-15, 1994.
16. C. Alonso-Alvarez, I. Munilla, M. Lopez-Alonso, and A. Velando, Sublethal Toxicity
of the Prestige Oil Spill on Yellow-Legged Gulls, Environment International 33:773-81,
2007.
17. NOAA, NOAA's OIL SPILL RESPONSE: EFFECTS OF OIL ON MARINE MAMMALS AND
SEA TURTLES, http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book-shelf/1887_Marine-Mammals-Sea-
Turtles-fact-sheet.pdf.
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respiration, excretion, chemoreception, feeding movements, stimulus
response, disease resistance, and chronic impacts.18
Through environmental statutes such as the National Environ-
mental Policy Act ("NEPA"), Congress imposes environmental
obligations on the federal government for activities it carries out,
funds, or authorizes, including those that lead to oil and gas drilling
and production. The goal of NEPA is that the action agency takes a
hard look at the activities it proposes and involves the public at an
early stage. To facilitate this goal, there are three levels of environ-
mental review under NEPA. NEPA mandates that for "major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment"
the action agency prepare an environmental impact statement
("EIS").19 An EIS is the most comprehensive of the three types of as-
sessment and is required for all actions that will significantly affect the
environment. An EIS should contain an analysis of alternatives and
the public should have an opportunity to comment on the draft EIS.
An agency may prepare an environmental assessment ("EA") where an
action may not have significant impacts or where the agency is unsure
of the significance of the impacts. An EA must include alternatives
and a review of the effects of the action. A categorical exclusion ("CE")
review is for actions the agency has pre-determined have no significant
impact.20 An agency may compile and publish a list of projects that
qualify for a CE, however, CEs may not be invoked when extraordinary
circumstances exist or where there would in fact be a significant
impact.
The Minerals Management Service ("MMS"), an agency of the
Department of the Interior ("DOI"), is charged with overseeing oil and
gas exploration on the outer continental shelf.2 1 MMS manages oil and
gas activities through a four-stage program under the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"). Pursuant to OCSLA, MMS oversees a
5-year lease program, conducts lease sales, and approves exploration
18. T.H. Suchanek, Oil impacts on marine invertebrate populations and communities,
American Zoologist 33:501-23, 1993.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
20. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4.
21. On June 18, 2010 the Department of the Interior changed the name of Minerals
Management Services to Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and
Enforcement ("BOEMRE"), see Change of the Name of the Minerals Management Service to
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, Order of the
Secretary No. 3302, U.S. Dept. of the Interior (June 18, 2010) available at http://www.doi.
gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PagelD=35872. On June 18,
2010 the Department of the Interior changed the name of Minerals Management Services to
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, see Secretarial Order
3302.
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plans and for the Gulf of Mexico only, development and production
plans (for all other regions, these are called development operations
coordination documents).22 Typically MMS conducts NEPA review at
each stage: an EIS for the 5-year program; an EIS for lease sales; an
EA for exploration plans; and an EIS for development and production
plans.23 However, in the western and central planning areas of the
Gulf of Mexico, exploration plans and development and production
plans are categorically excluded from environmental review. 24
It has become evident that there were a multitude of flaws in
MMS's implementation of NEPA and in its analysis of environmental
impacts with regard to BP's Macondo well. The well was on a tract
leased by BP on Mississippi Canyon Block 252, from Lease Sale 206,
approximately 50 miles off the coast of Louisiana. For the activities
leading up to the drilling of BP's Macondo well, MMS first issued an
EIS in April 2007 for the Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS") 5-Year Leas-
ing Program for oil drilling throughout the U.S.25 That same month,
MMS issued another EIS for the western and central lease sales. 26
Also in 2007, MMS issued an EA for Lease Sale 206, tiering to the two
previous EISs and finding no new significant impact. 27 Finally, in
April 2009, MMS issued a CE for BP's exploration plan which is what
authorized the drilling of Macondo well.2 8
22. See 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (2005); 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2005); 43 U.S.C. § 1340, and 43
U.S.C. § 1351.
23. BOEMRE, Oil and Gas Leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf, available at http:/
www.boemre.gov/PDFs/5BOEMRELeasingl0l.pdf.
24. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENT MANUAL, 516 DM 15.4(C)(10),
available at http://elips.doi.gov/app dm/actgetfiles.cfm?relnum=3625.
25. The D.C. Court of Appeals determined the environmental analysis under OCSIA
was insufficient and remanded it to the MMS for revision. Center for Biological Diversity v.
U.S. Department of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009). A preliminary revised 5-year
plan was subsequently released on April 2010. See Preliminary Revised 5-Year Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) Oil and Gas Leasing Program for 2007-2012, 75 Fed. Reg. 16833-01
(Apr. 2, 2010).
26. MMS, Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil and Gas Lease Sales: 2007-2012 Western Planning
Area Sales 204, 207, 210, 215, and 218, Central Planning Area Sales 205, 206, 208, 213, 216,
and 222, Draft Environmental Impact Statement (2006), available at www.gomr.mms.gov/
PDFs/2006/2006-062-Voll.pdf and http://www.gomr.mms.gov/PDFs/2006/2006-062-Vol2.
pdf.
27. MMS, Proposed GOM OCS Oil and Gas Lease Sale 206 Central Planning Area,
Environmental Assessment (2007), available at http://www.gomr.mms.gov/PDFs/2007/
2007-059.pdf.
28. Council on Environmental Quality, Report Regarding the Minerals Management
Service's National Environmental Policy Act Policies, Practices, and Procedures as They
Relate to Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Exploration and Development, Aug. 16, 2010
at 12, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/20100816-ceq-mms-ocs-
nepa.pdf.
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Inadequacies and flaws in MMS's analyses can be traced
throughout the NEPA process. For example, the EIS for the OCS 5-
Year Leasing Program, to which all other NEPA documents are tiered,
entirely underestimated the potential for a large oil spill. MMS esti-
mated that a large oil spill from a platform would be 1,500 barrels,2 9
and assumed that four such spills could occur within the 40-year lease
term. The EIS for the lease sales also concluded that a large oil spill
was a low-probability event, and found that the likely size of an oil spill
greater than 1,000 barrels would be 4,600 barrels.3 0 It concluded from
its modeling that natural weathering would dissipate a 4,600 barrel oil
spill 32-74%, 30-32% of the oil would be lost to atmospheric evapora-
tion, and that 2-42% of the oil would be lost via natural dispersion.3 1 It
also found a 99% chance of a 10,000 barrel oil spill occurring during the
40-year lease period, but did not conduct an analysis of the effects of
such an oil spill. 3 2 In each of its environmental analyses, MMS con-
cluded that the proposed activities would have no significant
environmental impact.
These estimates were clearly inadequate, not only in light of the
massive BP oil spill and when taking into account the fact that BP's
own estimates were much higher, but also in considering the fact that
a previous exploratory well drilled in only 160 feet of water - Ixtoc I -
had spilled 3.5 million barrels of oil in the Gulf of Mexico decades ear-
lier. Additionally, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") in
its analysis of OCS activities in the Gulf analyzed those impacts based
on the potential for an oil spill of 1.75 million barrels. 33 The Lease Sale
206 EA, which built upon the subsequent EISs and intended to provide
more site-specific environmental information, did not analyze the po-
tential for even a 4,600 barrel oil spill. The EA incorrectly
29. MMS, 2007-2012 Final Environmental Impact Statement, Ch. IV-Environmental
Consequences, at IV-29, available at http://www.boemre.gov/5-year/2007-2012FEIS.htm.
30. MMS, Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil and Gas Lease Sales: 2007-2012 Western Planning
Area Sales 204, 207, 210, 215, and 218, Central Planning Area Sales 205, 206, 208, 213, 216,
and 222, Draft Environmental Impact Statement ("Multisale EIS"), p. 4-232, available at
http://www.gomr.mms.gov/PDFs/2006/2006-062-Voll.pdf.
31. Id. at 4-226.
32. Id. at 4-234.
33. NMFS, Biological Opinion for Endangered Species Act Consultation on Gulf of
Mexico Oil and Gas Activities: Five-Year Leasing Plan for Western and Central Planning
Areas 2007-2012, at 78. Available at http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sf/deepwater-horizon/02611
MMS Leases 2007-2012.pdf. Ironically, NMFS settled on 1.75 million barrels (and not a
larger amount) because "[w]ith new technologically [sic] advances and oil spill prevention
and response plans, a major oil spill in the GOM would not likely be as large as Ixtoc I"
(citing MMS, Gulf of Mexico Oil and Gas Activities: 2007-2012 Western and Central
Planning Areas, MMS Gulf of Mexico Region Biological Assessment, 2006, at 149).
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characterized the subsequent EISs as overstating the environmental
impacts.34 Finally, in spite of finding that 119 loggerhead, 10 leather-
back, 1 hawksbill, 13 Kemp's ridley, and 38 green sea turtles would be
killed over the 40-year lease period, it concluded there would be no sig-
nificant environmental effect.35
While MMS did not prepare an EA for BP's exploration plan,
instead granting it a CE, BP discussed a worst case scenario response
in its exploration plan, finding that at the exploratory stage, a spill of
3,857 barrels a day was possible. 36 However, BP was not required to
discuss a blowout scenario in its exploration plan citing a 2008 Notice
to Lessees which exempted BP from providing a blowout scenario.37
Because MMS did not prepare an environmental review, did not re-
quire BP to discuss a blowout scenario, and MMS's environmental
review at the programmatic and lease sale levels were so inadequate,
both BP and the government were woefully unprepared to deal with
the eventual catastrophic oil spill.
A. Categorical Exclusion Policy
In all other regions, exploration plans undergo some form of
NEPA review. However, in the western and central planning areas of
the Gulf of Mexico, the exploration plans are categorically excluded
from environmental review. CEs are traditionally reserved for only the
most insignificant activities, activities that can have no possibility of
significant environmental impacts. Yet, hundreds of plans are ap-
proved every year pursuant to the CE policy, and in fact continued to
be approved even after the BP oil spill. This policy of categorically ex-
cluding plans and permits from environmental review is currently
being challenged in litigation.38 Additionally, the DOI is currently in-
34. MMS, Proposed Gulf of Mexico OCS Oil and Gas Lease Sale 206 Central Planning
Area, Environmental Assessment ("Lease 206 EA"), at 14, available at http://www.gomr.
mms.gov/PDFs/2007/2007-059.pdf.
35. Id. at 41.
36. See BP, Initial Exploration Plan ("BP's EP"), Mar. 10, 2009, at 7-1.
37. MMS, Notice to Lessees and Operators of Federal Oil, Gas and Sulfur Leases in the
Outer Continental Shelf, Gulf of Mexico: NTL No. 2008-GO4 (May 1, 2008), available at
http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/2008NTLs/08-g04.pdf; a subsequent
NTL revoked portions of the 2008 NTL, see MMS, Notice to Lessees and Operators of Federal
Oil and Gas Leases, Other Continental Shelf NTL No. 2010-NO6 (Jun. 1, 2010) (citing 30
C.F.R. § 250.213(g) (2006) requiring that operators disclose the volume of oil that could be
discharged in a blowout and its ability to control a blowout).
38. Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, Case No. 1:10-cv-00816 HHK (D.D.C.);
Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, Case No. 10-60417 (5th Cir.).
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dependently reviewing this policy,39 and has promised not to approve
plans pursuant to it until the review is complete. 4 0
Instead of having an opportunity to review and comment on the
environmental impacts of a proposed drilling activity, the public and
the federal government must rely upon the companies' explanations of
threats and promises to deal with them. For example, while BP was
not required to submit a site-specific oil spill response plan, it had cal-
culated in its exploration plan that the worst case scenario for an
uncontrolled well could be up to 162,000 barrels a day and certified
that it had "the capability to respond, to the maximum extent practica-
ble, to a worst-case discharge."4 1 In its exploration plan, BP predicted
that "[a]n accidental oil spill from proposed activities could cause im-
pacts to beaches. However, due to the distance to shore (48 miles) and
the response capabilities that would be implemented, no significant ad-
verse impacts are expected." 4 2 BP's conclusions are essentially the
same with regard to wetlands, shore and nesting birds, marine and
pelagic birds, beaches, essential fish habitat, coastal wildlife refuges
and wilderness areas.43 In light of the BP oil spill, it is evident that the
government can no longer rely on the industry's predictions and
promises in the risky ventures of oil and gas drilling and production.
On its face, the CE policy appears at odds with the primary pur-
pose of NEPA, which is to ensure that federal agencies conduct an
environmental review for proposed activities that may have a signifi-
cant impact on the environment. Regardless of whether MMS's policy
of categorically excluding exploration plans from environmental review
is illegal on its own, it appears the policy should never have been ap-
plied in the case of the BP's exploration plan to begin with. For
example, pursuant to the CE policy, certain types of activities do not
qualify for a categorical exclusion review because they are likely to
have a significant impact on the environment. MMS prohibits the use
of categorical exclusions in relatively untested deep water or remote
areas. 4 4 MMS does not further define deep water or remote areas in its
regulations, but it is hard to imagine that a well drilled in 4,990 feet of
39. See Notice of Intent to Conduct a Review of Categorical Exclusions for Outer
Continental Shelf Decisions, 75 Fed. Reg. 62418-01 (Oct. 8, 2010).
40. Memorandum from Michael Bromwich Dir. of BOEMRE on Use of Categorical
Exclusions in Gulf of Mexico Region to Walter Cruickshank, Deputy Dir. of BOEMRE, &
Robert LaBelle Acting Assoc. Dir. of OEMM, Aug. 16, 2010.
41. BP's EP, supra note 36, at 7-1.
42. Id. at 14-5 (alteration in the original).
43. Id. at 14-2, 14-6.
44. U.S. DOI, Dept. Manual Environmental Quality Programs, 15.4(C)(10) (May 27,
2004).
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water is not deep, and a rig located 50 miles from shore, is not remote.
Moreover, DOI regulations prohibit the use of categorical exclusions in
the event of extraordinary circumstances, which include those that
have significant impacts on public health or safety, have significant
impacts on natural resources, have highly controversial environmental
effects, have highly uncertain and potentially significant environmen-
tal effects or involve unique or unknown environmental risks, or have
significant impacts on listed species or their critical habitat. 4 5
The NEPA documents prepared by MMS subsequent to the oil
spill included each of the above extraordinary circumstances. Further-
more, as the BP oil spill has demonstrated, and like hundreds of other
oil spills before it, oil and gas drilling and production activities are
risky and have significant impacts. MMS should have never approved
BP's exploration plan pursuant to a categorical exclusion for drilling
activities planned in nearly 5,000 feet of water, 50 miles from shore,
and with no cogent plan for containing a blowout or responding to an
oil spill. Similarly, with the present knowledge that such an oil spill
and environmental impacts are possible, the MMS has no reasonable
basis to continue applying the CE policy to drilling activities as it is
now well-established that such activities can and do have significant
impacts on the environment.
III. INADEQUATE CONSULTATION UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The Endangered Species Act ("ESA") provides for the protection
and conservation of endangered and threatened species. The purpose
of the ESA is to "halt and reverse the trend toward species extinc-
tion."4 6 In furtherance of that goal, Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the
"take" of endangered species and mandates federal agencies to "insure
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out is not likely to jeop-
ardize the continued existence of any endangered species. . .or result in
the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species."4 7
The ESA defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct."48 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (for land species)
or the NMFS (for marine species) (collectively "Services") further de-
fine "harm" as "an act which actually kills or injures fish or wildlife.
45. 43 C.F.R. § 46.205(c)(1) (2010), § 46.215(a) - (d), (h).
46. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2010), § 1536(a)(2).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2010).
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Such an act may include significant habitat modification or degrada-
tion which actually kills or injures fish or wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, spawning,
rearing, migrating, feeding or sheltering."4 9
Federal agencies engaged in major activities must, therefore,
consult with the Services pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA. If after the
consultation the Services conclude that the proposed action will result
in take of the species, but is unlikely to jeopardize any listed species or
adversely modify critical habitat, the Services must provide the action
agency with an incidental take statement that sets forth the amount or
extent of the anticipated taking of listed species by specifying the im-
pact of the taking on the species, "reasonable and prudent measures"
to minimize such incidental take, and "terms and conditions" to imple-
ment those measures.50
Like the flawed NEPA process, there were several instances
throughout MMS's lease sale program where MMS failed to fully com-
ply with the ESA. This failure has resulted in the take of scores of
endangered and threatened species in the Gulf of Mexico. For exam-
ple, Section 7 consultation only occurred during the 5-Year Lease
Program for 2007-2012 in the Gulf of Mexico, and even this consulta-
tion was inadequate. Additionally, MMS did not consult for impacts
from the noise impacts of geological and geophysical exploration - or
seismic exploration.51 Noise pollution from seismic activities can se-
verely impact wildlife. Seismic surveys are conducted by the oil and
gas industry to explore for subsurface oil and gas. This typically in-
volves towing air-guns behind ships sounding 250 decibels or more,
every 10-12 seconds, days on end. This is many times more intense
than noise thresholds known to compromise foraging and other vital
behavior, a leading contributor to background noise, which carries for
thousands of miles. The consultation also did not include an incidental
49. 50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2010), 50 C.F.R. § 17.3; See generally, http://www.defenders.
org/newsroom/press releases folder/2010/10_20_2010_bp-responsible for harm to ecosys
temand-species in the-gulf.php (On October 20, 2010 environmental groups, Defenders of
Wildlife, Southern Environmental Law Center, Gulf Restoration Network, and Save the
Manatee Club, filed suit against BP for the take of at least 27 endangered and threatened
species).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4), (o); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (2011); Oregon Natural Resources
Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1034. (9th Cir. 2006).
51. On June 30, 2010, environmental groups, Natural Resources Defense Council,
Center for Biological Diversity, Gulf Restoration Network, and Sierra Club challenged
MMS's NEPA analysis with regard to geological and geophysical activities in the Gulf of
Mexico in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Salazar, 2:10-cv-01882 (E.D. Cal.). On
February 9, 2011, the same groups notified MMS of their intent to sue for violations of the
ESA and Marine Mammal Protection Act in the approval of seismic activities.
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take statement for the sperm whale, sea turtles (other than for vessel
strikes), gulf sturgeon, or the small-tooth sawfish.
MMS also did not seek consultation at the lease sale level which
would have provided additional local information, or at the exploration
plan or development and production plan level. Furthermore, the
Coast Guard and EPA did not consult with the Services for the contin-
ued authorization of the use of chemical dispersants known to or likely
to adversely affect multiple endangered and threatened species. 52
These failures to consult with the Services have led to the needless loss
of endangered and threatened species, and are in violation of federal
environmental laws.
IV. UNPRECEDENTED USE OF DISPERSANTS
Dispersants use toxic chemicals to break down oil into smaller
droplets which are intended to help the oil disperse. Dispersants are
known to have a wide array of impacts on marine wildlife. Unfortu-
nately, not only are the dispersants themselves toxic, they can increase
the toxicity of the oil to wildlife, and are thought to result in the forma-
tion of massive deepwater oil plumes.53
Banned in the United Kingdom for adverse effects to marine
wildlife, and never tested at the volume or depth it was applied, tests
confirm Corexit, a brand of dispersant, killed up to 25% of all living
organisms 500 ft. below the surface of the ocean where it was applied.54
Dispersants contain components that can interfere with lung function,
respiration, digestion, excretion, and a host of other life systems, simi-
lar to the effects of oil alone. About 1.4 million gallons were applied on
the surface of the ocean, and another 771,000 gallons were injected
into and around the wellhead, nearly one mile below the surface of the
ocean.55 With respect to the dispersants used most heavily in response
to the BP oil spill, Corexit 9500A and 9527A, part of the criticism rests
in the fact that these dispersants had never been used or tested in the
quantities or depths approved by the EPA.56
52. On June 2, 2010, the Center for Biological Diversity notified the EPA and Coast
Guard of its intent to sue for violations of Section 7 of the ESA.
53. NOAA, Analysis of Hydrocarbons in Samples Provided from the Cruise of the R/V
WEATHERBIRD II, May 23-26, 2010, NOAA, Silver Spring, Maryland, 20910.
54. Matt Gutman, L. Ferran, and B. Blackburn, EPA May Not Force BP to Change
Dispersants, ABC News, May 21, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/epa-bp-dispersants/story
?id=10711367.
55. www.whitehouse.gov/blog/issues/Deepwater-BP-oil-spill.
56. The recommended application volume is 2-10 gallons/acre. See EPA, Guide to
Using the NCP Product Schedule Notebook, (Mar. 2011).
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Another significant criticism is that of the EPA-approved dis-
persants, seven are less toxic than the Corexit dispersants, some ten
times less toxic, and six of the seven dispersants were found to be more
effective on Southern Louisiana crude oil than the Corexit products.5 7
Two of those were 100% effective compared to 55% (Corexit 9500A) and
63% (Corexit 9527A). On May 10, 2010, the EPA authorized BP's sub-
surface application of dispersants, requiring BP to first determine
whether the application was chemically breaking up the oil, and then
sample and delineate the dispersed plume.5 8 A week and a half later
EPA issued an addendum giving BP 24 hours to identify and use dis-
persants on the NCP Product Schedule that were more effective and
less toxic.59 Ultimately, BP did not use a more effective, less toxic dis-
persant; instead, the EPA directed it to cease its surface application
and reduce its subsurface application.60 While the full impact of the
use of the dispersants remains to be seen, scientists recently discov-
ered a large portion of the dispersants within a deep water oil plume,
meaning that the dispersants have not fully degraded.6 1
V. CONCLUSION
Congress imposes environmental obligations on the federal gov-
ernment precisely to avoid the type of catastrophe caused by the BP oil
spill. Federal environmental statutes like the National Environmental
Policy Act and Endangered Species Act are a vital safety net for our
nation's most imperiled species. These environmental laws are de-
signed to protect the environment by requiring the government to
analyze the effects of its activities and by involving the public in the
decision-making process. The BP oil spill has demonstrated that when
the federal government fails to comply with these environmental man-
dates, tragedy ensues.
Although MMS conducted multiple environmental reviews as-
sociated with Gulf of Mexico oil and gas drilling and production, it
57. National Contingency Plan Product Schedule Toxicity and Effectiveness
Summaries, http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/ncp/tox-tables.htm.
58. EPA, Dispersant Monitoring and Assessment Directive for Subsurface Dispersant
Application (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/subsurface-
dispersant-directive-final.pdf.
59. EPA, Dispersant Monitoring and Assessment Directive (Addendum 2), (2010),
available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/directive-addendum2.pdf.
60. EPA, Dispersant Monitoring and Assessment Directive (May 26, 2010).
61. Elizabeth B. Kujawinski, M.C. Kido Soule, D.L. Valentine, A.K. Boysen, K.
Longnecker, and M.C. Redmond, Fate of Dispersants Associated with the Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill, Environmental Science & Technology, Jan. 11, 2011.
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categorically excluded from environmental review BP's exploration
plan; the plan that authorized the drilling of the failed Macondo well.
The exploration plan is the first step in the regulatory process where
specific drilling plans are mentioned; therefore, it is the first opportu-
nity for the responsible management agency to conduct a detailed, site
specific environmental analysis. Yet BP's exploration plan did not un-
dergo a careful review. Had the Macondo well been located anywhere
else in the OCS, MMS most likely would have conducted a more thor-
ough review. Such an environmental review may have minimized the
extent of the damage from the oil spill, or at a minimum better pre-
pared BP and the government to respond to such a disaster.
